This table provides a summary of the districting principles relating to partisanship used by each state during the 2010s round of redistricting and, for Ohio, to be used in the 2020 round. The text of the principles is shown in the appendix.

### Partisanship in Districting Principles for 2010 and Beyond

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Preserve Cores of Prior Districts</th>
<th>Avoid Incumbent Pairs</th>
<th>Not Favor Incumbent</th>
<th>Not Favor Party</th>
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Key:

C = Required in congressional plans
L = Required in legislative plans
NC = Prohibited in congressional plans
NL = Prohibited in legislative plans
YC = Allowed in congressional plans
YL = Allowed in legislative plans

Source: NCSL 2016; Peter S. Wattson 2017
APPENDIX

Partisanship in Districting Principles for 2010 and Beyond

Alabama

Reapportionment Committee Guidelines for Congressional, Legislative, and State Board of Education Redistricting, adopted by Permanent Legislative Committee on Apportionment, May 2011

IV. CRITERIA FOR CONGRESSIONAL [AND] LEGISLATIVE *** DISTRICTS

7. The following redistricting policies are embedded in the political values, traditions, customs, and usages of the State of Alabama and shall be observed to the extent that they do not violate or subordinate the foregoing policies prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Alabama:

a. Contests between incumbent members of Congress [and] the Legislature *** will be avoided when ever possible.

Arkansas

House Concurrent Resolution No. 1006, 1991 Session

3. The committees acknowledge a preference for continuity of representation.

Arkansas Board of Apportionment, REDISTRICTING CRITERIA APPROVED BY THE COURTS (visited December 7, 2017)

Maintain Continuity of Representation where possible: It is permissible to avoid making current office holders run against other incumbents by not putting them in the same district. The rationale for this principle is that voters who have already chosen a candidate should be able to continue to choose that same candidate. At the same time, it is also possible that two incumbents might be placed in the same district if necessary.

Arizona

Constitution, Article 4, § 1, pt. 2

(14) The independent redistricting commission shall establish congressional and legislative districts.

* * * *

F. To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.

(15) Party registration and voting history data shall be excluded from the initial phase of the mapping process but may be
used to test maps for compliance with the above goals. The places of residence of incumbents or candidates shall not be identified or considered.

**California**

*Constitution, Article XXI*

Section 2.

* * * *

(d) The commission shall establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process using the following criteria as set forth in the following order of priority:

(e) The place of residence of any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.

**Delaware**

29 Delaware Code § 804. **Determining district boundaries; criteria.**

In determining the boundaries of the several representative and senatorial districts within the State, the General Assembly shall use the following criteria. Each district shall, insofar as is possible:

* * * *

(4) Not be created so as to unduly favor any person or political party.

**Florida**

*Constitution, Article III*

Section 20. **Standards for establishing congressional district boundaries.** In establishing congressional district boundaries:

(a) No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent * * *.

Section 21. **Standards for establishing legislative district boundaries.** In establishing legislative district boundaries:

(a) No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent * * *.

**Georgia**

*Guidelines, adopted by the House Committee on Congressional and Legislative Reapportionment and Redistricting, 1991-92*

6. Where the above stated criteria are met, efforts may be made to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions and the cores of existing districts and consideration may be given to avoiding contests between incumbents.
Hawaii

Constitution, Article IV

Section 6. Apportionment Within Basic Island Units.

* * * *

2. No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or political faction.

Hawaii Revised Statutes, Section 25-2(b)(1) to (6)

* * * *

In effecting the reapportionment and districting, the commission shall be guided by the following criteria:

(1) No district shall be drawn so as to unduly favor a person or political party.

Idaho

Idaho Code

§ 72-1506. Criteria governing plans. Congressional and legislative redistricting plans considered by the commission, and plans adopted by the commission, shall be governed by the following criteria:

* * * *

(1) Counties shall not be divided to protect a particular political party or a particular incumbent.

Iowa

Iowa Code

§ 42.4. Redistricting standards.

5. No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group. In establishing districts, no use shall be made of any of the following data:

a. Addresses of incumbent legislators or members of Congress.

b. Political affiliations of registered voters.

c. Previous election results.

Kansas

Guidelines and Criteria for 2012 Congressional and Legislative Redistricting, adopted by House Select Committee on Redistricting and Senate Committee on Reapportionment, January 9, 2012

Legislative Redistricting

2. Districts should be numerically as equal in population as practical within the limitations of Census geography and
application of guidelines set out below. Deviations should not exceed plus or minus 5 percent of the ideal population of 21,378 for each House district and 66,806 for each Senate district, except in unusual circumstances. (The range of deviation for House districts could be plus or minus 1,069 persons, for districts that could range in population from 20,309 to 22,447. The overall deviation for House districts could be 2,138 persons. The range of deviation for Senate districts could be plus or minus 3,340 persons, for districts that could range in population from 63,466 to 70,147. The overall deviation for Senate districts could be 6,681 persons.)

4. Subject to the requirement of guideline No. 2:

* * * *

   e. Contests between incumbent members of the Legislature or the State Board of Education will be avoided whenever possible.

**Congressional Redistricting**

2. Districts are to be as nearly equal to 672,105 population as practicable.

* * * *

4. Districts should attempt to recognize “community of interests” when that can be done in compliance with the requirement of guideline No. 2.

* * * *

   b. If possible, preserving the core of the existing districts should be undertaken when considering the “community of interests” in establishing districts.

**Kentucky**

*Criteria/Standards for Congressional Redistricting, adopted by Interim Joint Committee on State Government’s Redistricting Subcommittee, July 11, 1991*

8. Efforts will be made to preserve cores of existing districts where such efforts are consistent with and do not violate the other criteria stated herein, with the realization that Kentucky will lose one congressional district.

**Louisiana**

*Committee Rules for Redistricting, Louisiana House of Representatives, Committee on House and Governmental Affairs, adopted January 29, 2011*

To promote the development of a constitutionally acceptable redistricting plan, the committee adopts the following rules for itself, declaring the same to constitute minimally acceptable criteria for redistricting of the House of Representatives [and] Congress * * * *

1. **Criteria**

* * * *

   H. In order to minimize voter confusion, due consideration shall be given to traditional district alignments.

*Committee Rules for Redistricting, Louisiana Senate, Committee on Senate and Governmental Affairs, adopted February 16, 2011*
The Senate committee adopted the same rules as the House of Representatives, except that, in rule I (H), it changed “traditional district alignments” to “existing district alignments.”

**Minnesota**


**Congressional Districts**

7. Congressional districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of protecting or defeating incumbents. But the impact of redistricting on incumbent officeholders is a factor subordinate to all redistricting criteria that the panel may consider to determine whether proposed plans result in either undue incumbent protection or excessive incumbent conflicts.

**Legislative Districts**

9. Legislative districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of protecting or defeating an incumbent. But the impact of redistricting on incumbent officeholders is a factor subordinate to all redistricting criteria that the panel may consider to determine whether proposed plans result in either undue incumbent protection or excessive incumbent conflicts.

**Missouri**

*Redistricting Standards and Guidelines, adopted by the House Committee on Redistricting, 1991*

Districts will be:

* * * *

Other guidelines:

* * * *

(4) preserves the geographic cores of existing districts

**Montana**

*Montana Code Annotated*

§ 5-1-115. Redistricting criteria.

(3) A district may not be drawn for the purposes of favoring a political party or an incumbent legislator or member of congress. The following data or information may not be considered in the development of a plan:

(a) addresses of incumbent legislators or members of congress;

(b) political affiliations of registered voters;

(c) partisan political voter lists; or

(d) previous election results, unless required as a remedy by a court.
Nebraska

Legislative Resolution No. 7, adopted by the Nebraska Legislature, 2001

4. Insofar as possible, and within the context of principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court, district boundaries shall define districts that * * * preserve the cores of prior districts.

5. District boundaries shall not be established with the intention of favoring a political party or any other group or person.

6. In drawing district boundaries, no consideration shall be given to the political affiliations of registered voters, demographic information other than population figures, or the results of previous elections, except as may be required by the laws and Constitution of the United States.

* * * *

9. The following criteria shall be specifically applicable to the public bodies for which the Legislature will create new district boundaries in 2001:

United States House of Representatives

c. No plan will be considered which results in an overall range of deviation in excess of 1% or a relative deviation in excess of plus or minus 0.5%, based on the ideal district population. Any deviation from absolute equality of population must be necessary to the achievement of a legitimate state objective as that concept has been articulated by the United States Supreme Court. To the extent that such objectives are relied on, they shall be applied consistently, and shall include, but not be limited to * * * the preservation of the cores of prior districts.

Nevada

Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 1, Joint Standing Rules, adopted February 12, 2001


2. The population of each of the Nevada congressional districts must be as nearly equal as is practicable. Any population deviation among the congressional districts from the ideal district population must be necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective. Legitimate state objectives, as judicially determined, include making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts and avoiding contests between incumbent representatives.

Rule No. 13.5. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act.

1. The redistricting committees will not consider a plan that discernibly violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), which prohibits any state from imposing any voting qualification, standard, practice or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of any United States citizen’s right to vote on account of race, color or status as a member of a language minority group.

2. The redistricting committees will not consider a plan that is discernibly racially gerrymandered. Racial gerrymandering exists when:

a. race is the dominant and controlling rationale in drawing district lines; and

b. the Legislature subordinates traditional districting principles to racial considerations.
For the purposes of this subsection, “traditional districting principles” are those traditional redistricting principles that have been judicially recognized and include compactness of districts, contiguity of districts, preservation of political subdivisions, preservation of communities of interest, preservation of cores of prior districts, protection of incumbents and compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2).

New Mexico


7. Districts shall be drawn consistent with traditional districting principles. * * * [T]o the extent feasible, the legislature may seek to preserve the core of existing districts, and may consider the residence of incumbents.

New York

*Constitution, Article III*

§ 4. Readjustments and reapportionments; when federal census to control.

* * *

(c) Subject to the requirements of the federal constitution and statutes and in compliance with state constitutional requirements, the following principles shall be used in the creation of state senate and state assembly districts and congressional districts:

* * *

(5) Districts shall not be drawn to discourage competition or for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties. The commission shall consider the maintenance of cores of existing districts * * *

North Carolina

*2017 House and Senate Plans Criteria, adopted by North Carolina House and Senate Redistricting Committees, August 10, 2017*

* * *

*Incumbency Protection.* Reasonable efforts and political considerations may be used to avoid pairing incumbent members of the House or Senate with another incumbent in legislative districts drawn in the 2017 House and Senate plans. The Committees may make reasonable efforts to ensure voters have a reasonable opportunity to elect non-paired incumbents of either party to a district in the 2017 House and Senate plans.

*Election Data.* Political considerations and election results data may be used in the drawing of legislative districts in the 2017 House and Senate plans.
Ohio

Constitution, Article XI


The Ohio redistricting commission shall attempt to draw a general assembly district plan that meets all of the following standards:

(A) No general assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.

(B) The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

Oklahoma

2011 Guidelines for Redistricting, adopted by the House of Representatives Redistricting Committee, February 14, 2011

5. In addition, the House Redistricting Committee may seek to preserve the core of existing districts, and may consider the residence of incumbents.

Oregon

Oregon Revised Statutes

§ 188.010. Criteria for apportionment of state into congressional and legislative districts. The Legislative Assembly or the Secretary of State, whichever is applicable, shall consider the following criteria when apportioning the state into congressional and legislative districts:

* * *

2. No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring any political party, incumbent legislator or other person.

South Carolina

2011 Redistricting Guidelines, adopted by Senate Judiciary Committee, April 13, 2011

III. Additional Considerations

Other criteria that should be given consideration, where practical and appropriate, in no particular order of preference, are:

* * *

B. Constituent Consistency
Vermont

Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 17, Chapter 34A

§ 1906b. Division of Two-member Representative Districts.

(a) An initial district entitled to two representatives under section 1893 of this title may be divided into single-member representative districts as provided in this section.

* * * *

(c) In making a proposal under this section, the boards of civil authority shall consider:

* * * *

(4) incumbencies.

§ 1906c. Division of Districts Having Three or More Representatives.

(a) An initial district entitled to three or more representatives under section 1893 of this title shall be divided into single- and two-member representative districts as provided in this section.

* * * *

(c) In making a proposal under this section, the boards of civil authority shall consider

* * * *

(4) incumbencies.

Washington

Constitution, Article II

Section 43. Redistricting.

* * * *

(5) * * * The commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposely to favor or discriminate against any political party or group.

Revised Code of Washington

§ 44.05.090. Redistricting plan. In the redistricting plan:

* * * *

(5) The commission shall exercise its powers to provide fair and effective representation and to encourage electoral competition. The commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposely to favor or discriminate against any political party or group.